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ABSTRACT  
As the largest private sector employer in the United States, corporate retail 
giant Walmart continues to make waves in United States culture and the economy 
since launching its first store in 1962. As Walmart seeks to expand, the validity of 
its consumer guarantee to “save money, live better” has been increasingly 
scrutinized, given Walmart’s use of controversial business practices, most notably 
its employee benefit policies and anti-unionization efforts. With over 1.4 million 
employees in the United States, there is much talk surrounding the potential costs 
of Walmart’s low prices. This study analyzes selected healthcare and unionization 
impacts of Walmart in various Metropolitan Statistical Areas across the United States 
during the years 1996 - 2004. Using cross-sectional data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Current Population Survey, I perform an econometric analysis to evaluate 
the effect of the introduction of a Walmart store on Medicaid, Medicare, and private 
health insurance coverage as well as union membership and coverage. To address the 
endogeneity of Walmart’s decision to enter a particular area, I estimate a fixed effects 
model, controlling for year and Metropolitan Statistical Area effects. My results 
indicate that the introduction of a Walmart may initially appear beneficial through its 
creation of additional jobs and offering of low-priced goods. In addition, findings 
show that Walmart increases the probability of Medicaid and private health insurance 
coverage and has a negative effect on the probability of being a member of a union.
 
 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
 
I. Acknowledgements………………………………………..i 
II. Advice to Future Honors Students………………………..ii 
III. Introduction……………………………………………….1 
IV. Literature Review…………………………………………6 
V. Data Description…………………………………………..8 
VI. Estimation Strategy……………………………………….9 
VII. Empirical Results…………………………………………10 
VIII. Conclusion………………………………………………..16 
IX. Sources Cited and Consulted……………………………..20 
X. Appendices 
a.  Figures……………………………………………22 
b. Tables……………………………………………..26 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
 
 
I. Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank my parents, Mostapha and Elizabeth Ziad, for their 
continued motivation, support and encouragement throughout my undergraduate 
experience. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the Undergraduate 
Economics Department and Renée Crown University Honors Program at 
Syracuse University for making this research possible through their support and 
endorsement. I wish to extend my deepest thanks to Professor Jeffrey Weinstein 
and to my fellow Economics Program of Distinction students for their support, 
advice, and encouragement throughout this researching and writing process. 
Lastly and most importantly, this project would not have been possible without 
the guidance and assistance provided by Professor Chris Rohlfs, who has been an 
invaluable resource, advisor, and role model throughout this process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
II. Advice to Future Honors Students 
Having the opportunity write an honors and economics thesis has been a 
challenging, but rewarding experience that has enhanced my undergraduate 
experience at Syracuse in a profound manner.  Being given the opportunity to 
interpret data and apply it to an area of interest has given me an insight into the 
world of economic research and the ways in which statistics and findings can be 
applied towards understanding current events. I would advise future honors 
students to follow their passions and complete their capstone in a subject area that 
not only interests them, but also inspires them. Substantial time and dedication to 
the project is necessary and at times it is daunting; however the reward of 
completing a project that is entirely your own is an extremely gratifying feeling 
and worth every minute of stress and hard work. Be diligent with your time 
management, allot yourself double the time you expect to need as you will always 
find yourself wishing for more time, and have fun with it! 
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III. Introduction 
Corporate retail giant “Walmart” has continued to make headlines since its 
initial store opening in 1962. With an appeal of low, affordable prices on 
everyday items, it has constructed a heroic image of itself backed by a motto 
promising Americans the opportunity to “save money, live better” (Walmart.com 
2011). As shown in figure 1, Walmart has rapidly expanded throughout the 
United States in the past twenty years. As a result, this discount mass 
merchandising chain has become a staple in American society and a cultural 
phenomenon that is spreading across continents. Walmart currently employs more 
than 2.1 million associates worldwide, covers 617 square footage of the United 
States, and earned $419 billion in fiscal sales for the 2011 year (Walmart 2011). 
However, recent concerns have emerged regarding Walmart’s controversial 
business practices including its use of government subsidies, predatory pricing, 
outsourcing methods, and poor treatment of employees. This has incited much 
debate and hesitation in the local communities in which Walmart wishes to enter. 
Existing research provides varied findings on Walmart’s socioeconomic impacts 
and reflects a further need for analysis, particularly in areas of its employment 
practices and the ensuing impacts on labor market characteristics, the utilization 
of public assistance, and relevant federal and local fiscal policy.1 This paper seeks 
to examine the implications that Walmart’s presence and introduction into a 
Metropolitan Statistical Area may have on rates of Medicaid, Medicare, private 
                                                          
1 This need for further scrutiny is most recently echoed in legislation passed by the San Diego 
Senate requiring new Walmart superstores to prepare economic impact analyses as part of their 
permit acquisition process (Gardner 2011). 
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health insurance coverage, union membership, union coverage, income, retail 
employment, and food stamp receipt.  
The wide uncertainty in academic literature surrounding Walmart’s 
socioeconomic effects is striking in light of the level of public attention and 
controversy surrounding its name. Costs and benefits associated with Walmart are 
often exposed to the American public through media headlines, anecdotal 
evidence, and Walmart’s own public relation campaigns, but this information is 
unlikely to be impartial. The economic literature surrounding Walmart is vast but 
altogether quite inconclusive. Many researchers have examined Walmart’s effects 
on retail prices, wages, and employment levels. Notable studies include those of 
Basker (2005) and Ciccarella, Neumark, and Zhang (2005) who find a reduction 
in county-level retail employment and earnings as a result of Walmart. Both use 
an instrumental variable approach to correct for the problem of endogeneity in 
Walmart’s entry decision. Literature exploring Walmart’s effects on employee 
benefits and reliance on anti-poverty programs is much less prevalent. Michael 
Hicks (2005) examines Walmart’s impact on Federal and state anti-poverty 
expenditures from 1978-2003 and finds that each new Walmart worker is causing 
the average state to spend just under $900 per year in Medicaid benefits, which 
remains consistent with other studies conducted on Medicaid costs of low wage 
workers in the United States. Similarly, Dube, Eidlin, and Lester (2007) perform a 
state-level analysis of Walmart stores on healthcare benefits and find a Walmart 
store opening decreases employer-sponsored health insurance by 0.1%.  Although 
these studies veer away from the common employment, price, and wage level 
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analyses, they fail to acknowledge other impacts of Walmart’s employment 
practices, notably that of its anti-unionization policy which prohibits employees 
from organizing or forming unions and asserts that failure to comply with this 
policy can be grounds for termination. The company defends this policy by 
explaining that, “At Wal-Mart, we respect the individual rights of our associates 
and encourage them to express their ideas, comments and concerns. Because we 
believe in maintaining an environment of open communications, we do not 
believe there is a need for third-party representation.” (Walmart 2005) 
The current study contributes to this literature by expanding the scope of 
Walmart’s effects. My research uses a wider range of outcome variables that 
address both Walmart’s health care benefits and anti-unionization policy. By 
estimating the effects of Walmart on Medicaid, Medicare, private health insurance 
coverage, food stamp receipt, union membership and coverage in addition to 
income and retail employment, this study dives deeper into the realms of 
Walmart’s influence on the American public. While the current literature 
frequently examines Walmart’s impacts on rural communities and small towns 
(see Stone 1989, 1995, 1997, 2002), this study analyses Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSA). 2  A historical look at Walmart shows that, during its rapid 
expansion in the 1980s and 90s, a large majority of its new stores were introduced 
into metropolitan areas rather than rural areas. Conducting analysis at the MSA-
                                                          
2 MSA is a geographic entity defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget as a vicinity 
that has at least one urbanized area of 50,000 or more inhabitants. Each MSA consists of one or 
more counties, including the county containing the core urban area and adjacent counties deemed 
to have a high degree of social and economic integration in relation to the urban core (U.S. Census 
Bureau 2011). 
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level provides increased accuracy since metropolitan areas tend to have better-
paying jobs with higher rates of unionization, suggesting a greater sustained 
impact in comparison to rural areas. MSA-level analysis also provides research of 
greater relevancy to the general public, given the larger resistance towards 
Walmart openings in metropolitan areas compared to elsewhere.   
Using Walmart store openings compiled by Thomas  J. Holmes and cross-
sectional data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey’s March 
Annual Social and Economic Study, econometric analysis is performed on 85 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in which 255 Walmart stores, including 
Supercenters, were opened during the years 1996-2004. The estimation strategy 
utilized is comprised of two equations which incorporate a vector of controls to 
correct for any possible sources of bias, particularly the endogeneity of a Walmart 
store opening. This vector varies across specifications and includes controls for 
MSA demographics, a linear time trend, and MSA and year fixed effects to 
disentangle the effects of Walmart from its entry decision. These controls, along 
with evidence presented by Hicks and Wilburn (2001) and Franklin (2001) that 
prove that the location and timing of Walmart entries are unaffected by regional 
economic conditions and growth, seek to eliminate any potential endogeneity. 
An additional feature of this study is the use of sensitivity checks to 
examine potential patterns in the effect of Walmart and test the validity of my 
estimation strategy. Using lead and lag variables in my regression analysis to look 
at outcome variables both before and after a Walmart introduction, I am able to 
evaluate the specific time-pattern that I predict will occur in response to a store 
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opening. I hypothesize that this will pattern show no effects five or so years 
before a Walmart opening, as the intent to introduce a store is unknown. This will 
be followed by slight effects one to two years before the opening, suggesting a 
response to store-opening indications such as construction. Further, I expect 
Walmart’s effects to be biggest immediately following its opening, with gradually 
less effects when the novelty of the new store wears off and the surrounding 
community adjusts to its presence. The results of these sensitivity checks can 
prove useful in disentangling short-term and long-term patterns, thus allowing a 
better understanding of Walmart’s total effect. 
Although I achieve mixed results, my initial findings indicate positive 
effects on private health insurance and Medicaid coverage as a result of a 
Walmart store opening. Union membership appears to decline slightly due to 
Walmart while the effects on Medicare coverage remain unclear. Results indicate 
varied effects of Walmart on retail employment, union coverage rates, food stamp 
recipients, and income levels, but my findings appear to follow the predicted 
time-specific pattern previously described, in which short-term effects appear 
more pronounced. 
 The remainder of this paper provides a detailed explanation of my 
research and is organized as follows: Section III provides a more in-depth 
literature review of case studies relevant to this research. Section IV presents a 
description of the data used to complete this study. Section V outlines the 
estimation strategy utilized to obtain these results and includes key factors 
associated with this method. Section VI provides an in-depth consideration of the 
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empirical results. Section VII ends the paper with a concluding summary and 
remarks on potential policy implications.  
 
IV. Literature Review 
Research on Walmart’s impact on healthcare and unionization is quite limited in 
comparison to the considerable amount of literature on employment and wage 
consequences. Often-cited early studies done by Kenneth Stone (1989) suggest 
negative impacts of Walmart on rural communities in the United States,  
highlighting negative effects sustained to the retail industry and per capita sales in 
small-town areas.3 Basker (2005) examines county-level employment and finds 
that a net gain in retail sector jobs prior to a Walmart opening is concurrent with a 
net loss of jobs in the wholesale sector. Neumark, Zhang and Ciccarella (2007) 
also perform a notable study, finding that county level employment and wages of 
retail sector workers are adversely affected by the introduction of a Walmart. 
Though these case studies provide conclusive findings, they suffer from two 
major shortcomings. The first limitation is the narrow scope of these studies, as 
they often focus on only one particular state or region. Additionally, they fail to 
examine a full picture of employee well-being because their emphasis on 
employment rates and wage levels overlooks the potential effects of Walmart’s 
employment benefits.  
                                                          
3 See Stone (1989, 1995, 1997, and 2002) for his ongoing literature regarding Walmart’s effect on 
small-town communities. His overall findings indicate that the introduction of a Walmart 
substantially hurts towns in Iowa and Mississippi due to local competitors being driven out of 
business. Stone determines “pull factors” that account for the percentage of the population 
frequenting Walmart and assesses the consequent changes in sales, relative to non-Walmart areas. 
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The first major study to examine Walmart employee reliance on anti-
poverty programs was conducted by Dube and Jacobs (2004). The authors find 
that Walmart’s insufficient wages and lack of benefits cause a reliance of its 
Californian workers on public assistance, resulting in significant public costs. 
Further findings by Dube, Eidlin, and Lester (2007) project that the introduction 
of ten new Walmart stores in a given state will result in a one percentage point 
reduction in the retail sector employer-sponsored health insurance rate. Similarly, 
studies conducted by Michael Hicks (2005) have examined Walmart’s potential 
role in the use of state and Federal anti-poverty programs by its employees. 
Hicks’ research shows that Walmart increases Medicaid expenditures but has no 
impact on food stamp expenditures in the retail sector and a negative impact on 
AFDC/TANF expenditures.4  
 The main concern in the academic literature remains the question of 
whether Walmart’s choice of entrance location and time is endogenous. It is 
unclear whether the decision to open a Walmart store is non-random, correlated 
with demographic factors, such as age and racial breakdown, as well as levels of 
income, employment, and retail competition. The timing of a store opening may 
be a calculated decision based on current socioeconomic conditions and future 
projections. To address this matter of endogeneity, Neumark et al. (2007) use a 
geographic pattern of Walmart store openings over time as an instrumental 
variable. Basker (2005) utilizes a similar instrumental variable approach for store 
                                                          
4 Hicks (2005) finds that Walmart increases Medicaid expenditures by roughly $898 per worker 
per year. Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) was renamed to Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) in 1996 and provides support to children in poor, non-working 
families. 
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openings, correcting for both endogeneity as well as measurement error. 
However, research conducted by Hicks and Wilburn (2001), as well as Franklin 
(2001), provides evidence that the location and timing of Walmart entries are 
unaffected by regional economic conditions and growth.5 This provides me with 
enough reassurance that no correction for endogeneity is needed and as a result I 
will not be correcting for endogeneity.  
 
V. Data Description 
 
Data on healthcare coverage, employment, income, union coverage, and 
other demographic variables such as age, racial, and employment composition, 
were taken from the March component of the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey pooled over the years 1996-2004. Walmart store openings data 
were obtained from Professor Thomas J. Holmes at the University of Minnesota, 
who provides the date and location for the 3,243 Walmart stores opened between 
July 1, 1962 and October 26, 2005. The unit of observation in this study is MSA-
year. I concentrate on the data for 85 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) 
identified in the CPS (see Table 1).  This panel of MSAs contains 255 Walmart 
stores, including supercenters, opened between the years of 1996 and 2004. 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Separate tests in each study model the entrance of Walmart stores and Supercenters as a function 
of demographic and economic variables.  
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VI. Estimation Strategy 
My approach estimates the contemporaneous effect of Walmart on income 
and retail employment levels, Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurance 
coverage, food stamp recipients, and union membership and coverage. The 
equation is specified for each variable as follows:  
(1) Yit  = β0 + β1 Walmartsit + βxXit + Uit 
where the dependent variable, Yit  is for a given MSA i observed at time t. Yit  is 
assumed to be a linear function of Walmartsit, the number of Walmart stores in 
MSA i at time t and Xit is a vector of controls that varies across specifications. Xit 
includes MSA characteristics such educational attainment, age, and racial 
composition, a linear time trend, and MSA fixed effects models to correct for 
spatial autocorrelation. Uit is a mean-zero unobservable within the regression. I 
assume that Cov(Walmartsit,Uit)=0, meaning that the number of Walmart stores in 
MSA i in year t is uncorrelated with the error term. 
 Endogeneity in Walmart’s timing of entrance and choice of location is the 
foremost concern when employing this estimation strategy. At the individual 
level, Walmartsit may be correlated with MSA or year-specific characteristics, 
suggesting that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of β1 are likely biased. 
This paper avoids these biases by including demographic controls in Xit including 
educational attainment, age, and racial composition. Furthermore, statistical 
models are employed to correct for correlation between the error term and the 
explanatory variables in the case that Walmart openings are non-random. An 
MSA fixed-effects model allows me to control for various observed and 
 
unobserved tmie-
models with MSA
by allowing a different trend for each MSA while also accounting for influences 
on changes in Y
specifications includ
across time and ensure that any outliers or fluctuations are independent from one 
time period to the next. 
 The second estimation strategy utilizes lagged explanatory variables to 
measure the effe
following the introduction of a Walmart store. This equation is expressed as:
(2) Yit  =   δ0 + 
where L is the number of lag or lead variables used in the regression. In some 
specifications, lead variables are also included for one, two, and three years 
preceding the opening of a Walmart store. The various specifications of Equation 
(2) include a vector o
 
VII. Empirical Results
 
Descriptive statistics for population, income, age and racial composition, 
employment, educational attainment levels, and health insurance of the analyzed 
MSAs are reported in Table 2. On a
population of approximately 945,023 residents in years 1996
percentage of individuals in the data set covered by private health insurance is 
invariant trends in Yit for each MSA. Similarly, fixed effec
-specific time trends account for variation in linear time trends 
it that might be correlated with Walmart openings. Most 
e a time trend to test the assumption that Y
 
ct of Walmart on Yit one, two, three, four, and five years 
 δj+1 Walmartsit-j + δxXit + Uit 
f controls identical to that of Equation (1).  
 
verage MSAs in this data set have a 
-2004. The average 
10 
ts 
it is constant 
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57.03%, while Medicaid coverage averages at 9.2% and Medicare coverage at 
13.44%. Union membership among survey participants in the data set remains 
very low at 1.30% with union coverage6 even lower at 0.15%7. The average level 
of retail employment is 10.64% and average income $20,908.11. I assume 
Walmart has the greatest effect on the low-skill, low-wage market. Thus, these 
characteristics aid in discerning whether the affected individuals in the data set 
generally reflect workers likely to be participating in this labor market. 
Figure 2 provides descriptive statistics on Walmart store openings in the analyzed 
MSAs during the time period of 1996 to 2004. As indicated on the pie chart, 40% 
of the analyzed MSAs experienced the opening of one Walmart store while 21% 
experienced two Walmart store openings and 9% experienced 11 openings. The 
remaining percentages indicate a range of store openings during this time period, 
reaching a high of 17 store openings in the Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 
MSA. Figure 3 provides a comparison of MSA population size to frequency of 
store openings, and indicates a positive relationship between population size and 
the number of store openings. 
To examine the overall effect of Walmart on health care coverage and 
unionization, I begin my empirical analysis by using Equation (1) to estimate the 
effect of Walmart’s presence (the number of Walmart stores in MSA i at time t) 
                                                          
6 Union coverage rates reflect answers to the CPS survey question reading, “On this job, are you 
covered by a union or employee association contract?”  Union coverage reflects third-party 
representation which aids in the negotiation of wages, total compensation, benefits, and workplace 
protections. 
7
 Comparing unionization rates and unionization coverage in my sample to that of the entire set of 
MSAs n the US over the same time period, I find that unionization rates and union coverage are 
both higher in the entire set of MSAs (13.6% versus 1.3% and 14.9% versus 0.15%). This could 
be due to Walmart’s decision to enter areas with lower rates of union membership and coverage. It 
is important to consider these differences when interpreting the empirical results in Section VII. 
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on Medicaid coverage, union membership rates, and private health care coverage. 
The Medicaid variable used in these regressions was obtained from the CPS 
survey question reading, “At any time in the last year were you/was anyone in this 
household covered by Medicaid/(fill state name), the government assistance 
program that pays for health care?” Similarly, the private health insurance 
variable used was obtained from the CPS survey question reading, “At any time 
during the last year, were you/was anyone in this household covered by a plan 
that you/they purchased directly, that is, not related to current or past employer?”  
The union membership variable examined was obtained from the survey question 
asked of all employed participants, “On this job, are you a member of a labor 
union or of an employee association similar to a union?” To more easily interpret 
the coefficients, all coefficients from the original regression are multiplied by 
100. Thus, the coefficients of interest can be read as percentage point changes in 
the average rates of coverage. The regression results for seven different 
specifications of Equation (1) can be seen in Table 3 of the appendix. Estimates 
for Medicaid coverage are represented in Panel A, Union Membership in Panel B, 
and Private Health Care coverage in Panel C. Column (1) denotes a basic 
Ordinary Least Squares regression with no controls. In columns (2) through (7), 
controls are increasingly added to correct for any possible bias and increase the 
precision of the coefficient estimates.  Column (7) reflects the preferred 
specification with a full set of controls that includes demographic controls as well 
as MSA and year-fixed effects. 
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In general, the OLS regression results in Table 3 indicate a negative effect 
of Walmart presence on Medicaid coverage and union membership and a positive 
effect on private healthcare coverage. The coefficients are quite varied between 
specifications, with statistical significance at the 5% level only for regression 
columns (1), (2), (3), and (6) of Panel A, (1) of Panel B, and (1), (2), (4), and (5) 
of Panel C. Although regressions in column (1) exhibit significance across all 
three panels, this is likely due to omitted variable bias because there are no 
control variables. The coefficients for union membership are quite small and 
imprecise, but the results across all specifications exhibit a decreasing probability 
of union membership for each additional Walmart, which is to be expected given 
Walmart’s anti-unionization policy. Similarly, in each specification I estimate a 
positive effect of the number of Walmarts on the likelihood of private healthcare 
coverage. Looking at regression (7) of Panel C, the magnitude of this increased 
probability can be understood through analysis concluding that the introduction of 
100 additional Walmart stores in a given MSA and year lowers the fraction of 
people who are covered by private insurance by 0.103, or ten percentage points. 
Putting this into a more realistic perspective, the introduction of ten additional 
Walmart stores in a given MSA and year would thus decrease the fraction of 
people with private health insurance coverage by .01, or one percentage point. 
However, this may be indicative of an overall rising trend in private healthcare 
rates that is not directly a cause of Walmart’s presence. 
 As I do not expect the entry of a Walmart store or additional opening of a 
Walmart store to have an immediate effect on the outcome variables, (it may take 
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time for a new store to get established), it is interesting to look at the lagged 
effects of a Walmart opening and the number of Walmart stores on healthcare and 
unionization variables. Table 4 contains regression coefficients from Equation (2), 
depicting the lagged effects of Walmart openings on Medicaid coverage, union 
membership, and private health care coverage. Columns (1), (4), and (7) indicate 
the lagged effects for the initial three years on Medicaid coverage, union 
membership, and private health care coverage, respectively, using the preferred 
specification of full controls. L1. Walmart Opened represents one year following 
the opening of a Walmart store, L2. Walmart Opened represents two years 
following the opening of a Walmart store, and L3. Walmart Opened represents 
three years following the opening of a Walmart store. Similarly, columns (2), (5), 
and (8) indicate lagged effects for four years after a Walmart store opening and 
columns (3), (6), and (9) indicate lagged effects for five years after a Walmart 
store opening for each outcome variable.  
 The regression results shown in Table 4 contain varied signs and 
magnitudes of the coefficients suggesting mixed results for Walmart’s short-term 
effect in the immediate years following its arrival. Medicaid coverage exhibits a 
decline in the initial one to two years after store opening subsequently followed 
by an increase in years three and four. The lagged effects on union membership 
are unclear, showing an ambiguous influence of Walmart that is likely due to the 
small percentage of survey participants who answered “yes” to having been a 
member of a labor union. Walmart’s short-term effects on private health care 
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coverage also appear uncertain in these regressions due to varied results across 
models.  
 To investigate Walmart’s overall effect on society, Equation (1) with a full 
set of controls is used to estimate Walmart’s effect on income levels, Medicare 
coverage, union coverage, food stamp recipients, and retail employment levels. 
These results are shown in Table 5. Though the coefficients are small and 
generally imprecise, they indicate that a Walmart store has an overall negative 
effect on income, Medicare, food stamp recipients, and retail employment and no 
discernable effect on union coverage. Table 6 displays Equation (2) for these 
same outcome variables reflecting the lagged effects of Walmart store openings 
for up to five years after store onset. There does not seem to be a conclusive 
pattern in the effects of Walmart over time for these outcome variables.  
 Figure 4 provides sensitivity checks, measuring the precision of my 
estimation strategy and assessing a potential time-specific pattern of the effects 
surrounding a Walmart store opening. These regressions utilize the same equation 
shown in Equation (2) with additional lead explanatory variables included. For 
each panel, leads and lags years of three years prior to and three years preceding a 
Walmart store opening are plotted on the x-axis and the coefficient estimates are 
plotted on the y-axis.  
Panels C and H, which measure the effects of private healthcare coverage 
and food stamp recipients exhibit increasing trends both before and after Walmart 
opening, indicating a general positive trend in the rates of these variables that may 
not be related to the opening of a Walmart. However Panel D, which reflects the 
16 
 
impact of Walmart entry on retail employment, shows a direct change in retail 
employment in the year of store introduction. This is followed by a sign reversal 
after two years of store existence, which supports my hypothesized time-specific 
pattern of effect. Further, the effect on Medicaid coverage shown in Panel A, the 
effect on union membership shown in Panel B, and the effect of Medicare 
coverage shown in Panel F all exhibit a trend one year prior to Walmart entry 
(decreasing for Medicaid and Medicare and increasing for union membership) 
followed by a sign reversal starting to trend the other way after two years of 
Walmart’s presence. Lastly, Panels E and F, income and union coverage 
respectively, indicate an increasing trend that starts two years preceding the 
opening of a Walmart, and in the case of income, is also reversed after two years 
of existence. 
 
VIII. Conclusion
 
The debate surrounding Walmart’s effects on the United States continues 
to spark public interest and cause contention throughout academia. While 
Walmart argues its presence serves to help America “save money, live better,” 
critics point to its use of unfair business practices, which they justify by observing 
Walmart’s monopsonistic presence in a low-skill, low-wage labor market. This 
study provides empirical consideration of Walmart’s effects on various indicators 
of consumer and employee well-being. While my analysis fails to find consistent 
effects, given many imprecise and varying results, this study nonetheless provides 
interesting findings. Private health insurance and Medicaid coverage appear to 
increase as a result of Walmart entrance. Union membership appears to decline 
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slightly, while the effects sustained to Medicare coverage rates remains unclear. 
Furthermore, retail employment, union coverage rates, income, and food stamp 
recipients appear to follow the hypothesized time-specific pattern in which slight 
effects are sustained one to two years prior to store arrival, while the most 
pronounced effects occur immediately after store opening and taper off within a 
few years.  
Given the high turnover rate and quantity of casual workers in the retail 
industry, it is difficult to accurately ascertain the effects sustained to retail 
workers in the aftermath of a Walmart opening. An increase in Medicaid coverage 
rates may be reflective of changes in the labor force due to situations in which 
Walmart plays a contributing role. For example, retail workers whose former 
employers have been crowded out of the market due to the entry of a Walmart are 
faced with unemployment and may be forced to take jobs at Walmart offering 
lesser pay and decreased benefits, thus qualifying them for welfare services.8 
Counter arguments to this explanation of increased Medicaid coverage rates 
suggest that Medicaid eligible workers experience a real income increase by 
choosing Medicaid in lieu of employer-based health insurance in which premiums 
and co-pays are required (Hicks 2005).  The choice of medical coverage is thus a 
utility maximizing decision made by the worker and may also explain the 
                                                          
8 The Medicaid program was enacted to provide health care to low-income children, families, and 
individuals who fit into an eligibility group recognized by federal and state law. Qualification for 
Medicaid is based on age, income and resources, and whether the individual is pregnant, disabled, 
blind, and/or aged.  It is a state administered program with separately mandated guidelines for 
eligibility and services (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services - Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services 2011). 
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increasing rates of private health care coverage found in this study, as employees 
find it most beneficial to purchase their own form of coverage.  
Others argue that employing large numbers of low-wage workers is a 
strategy used by large firms, such as Walmart, that seek to avoid the costs of 
providing employer-sponsored health care (see Cutler and Gruber 1996). By 
making eligibility for benefits more difficult for workers, many may opt to utilize 
alternative forms of coverage. In the case of Walmart, part-time status was 
increased in 2002 from those who work 28 hours per week or less to cover those 
who work 34 hours per week or less. This may help to explain the rise and 
patterns seen in welfare dependence, as workers may have initially received 
benefits before more stringent requirements were placed making them ineligible.   
 In its March 2010 Corporate Fact Sheet, Walmart states, “The majority of 
our associates work full-time. Many of our associates are senior citizens who need 
supplemental income or students who want work experience.” Given this 
assertion, the question that must be asked is whether the provision of employee 
benefits is still a major concern. Students are dependents and are therefore 
covered by their providers of care or by the state, and any citizen over age 65 is 
eligible for Medicare.9 Given these two groups’ guaranteed access to healthcare 
coverage, the issue of Walmart’s effect on their healthcare is of lesser concern and 
                                                          
9
 The Medicare program was established in 1965 as part of the Social Security Act extending 
health insurance coverage to all people aged 65 and older. In 1972, eligibility was further extended 
to include people under the age of 65 with long-term disabilities and individuals with end-stage 
renal disease. Thus, the Medicare eligibility requirement does not rely on measures of employment 
or income, making Walmart’s effect on healthcare inconsequential. (U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services - Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 2011) 
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helps to explain Walmart’s indiscernible effects on Medicare coverage rates seen 
in this study. 
While the results of this study do not provide conclusive results as to the 
effects of Walmart, they do provide interesting insight into both sides of the 
Walmart debate. Looking at preceding and subsequent years of a Walmart 
introduction provides interesting patterns, but it also suggests that the placement 
of Walmart stores is non-random and thus the problem endogeneity of Walmart’s 
entrance decision still remains. Given the opportunity, I would like to pursue 
future work on this topic using an instrumental variable approach to better correct 
for the problem of endogeneity and to obtain more precise results. While 
Walmart’s anti-unionization policy and poor employee treatment remain 
troubling, it is clear from the mixed results presented in this case study that 
further research is necessary before taking a definitive stance for or against the 
presence of Walmart in American society. 
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a. Figures 
 
Figure 1: Location of Walmart Openings, 1970-2001 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Walmart Openings in Analyzed MSAs, 1996-2004 
 
 
Figure 3: Average Population vs. Number of Store Openings in Analyzed MSAs 
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Figure 4: Lead and Lag Effects of Walmart Openings 
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Figure 4 (continued): Lead and Lag Effects of Walmart Openings 
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b. Tables 
Table 1: Metropolitan Statistical Areas Analyzed 
MSA Area Encompassed 
 
Population* 
Number of 
Walmarts Opened 
1996 - 2004 
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 4,247,981 10 
12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD 2,552,994 12 
12940 Baton Rouge, LA  705,973 2 
13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 1,052,238 5 
14600 Bradenton-Sarasota-Venice, FL 589,959 2 
15980 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 440,888 1 
16300 Cedar Rapids, IA 237,230 1 
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC 1,330,448 2 
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 2,009,632 4 
17300 Clarksville, TN-KY 232,000 1 
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 2,148,143 6 
17820 Colorado Springs, CO 537,484 2 
19340 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 376,019 2 
19500 Decatur, IL 114,706 1 
19740 Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO  2,179,240 8 
20100 Dover, DE 126,697 1 
20260 Duluth, MN-WI 275,486 1 
20620 East Liverpool-Salem, OH 112,075 1 
21500 Erie, PA 280,843 5 
21660 Eugene-Springfield, OR 322,959 4 
22180 Fayetteville, NC 336,609 2 
22420 Flint, MI 436,141 1 
22660 Fort Collins-Loveland, CO 251,494 1 
24540 Greeley, CO  180,926 1 
24580 Green Bay, WI 282,599 1 
26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 4,715,407 17 
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 1,525,104 4 
27100 Jackson, MI 158,422 1 
27260 Jacksonville, FL 1,122,750 3 
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS 1,836,038 6 
28740 Kingston, NY 177,749 1 
29460 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 483,924 1 
29540 Lancaster, PA 470,658 3 
29700 Laredo, TX 193,117 1 
29740 Las Cruces, NM 174,682 1 
29820 Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 1,375,765 7 
30700 Lincoln, NE 266,787 1 
32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 569,463 1 
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 2,968,806 7 
34820 Myrtle Beach-North Myrtle Beach-Conway, SC 196,629 2 
34940 Naples-Marco Island, FL 251,377 1 
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 1,316,510 4 
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Table 1 continued: Metropolitan Statistical Areas Analyzed  
MSA Area Encompassed Population* 
Number of 
Walmarts Opened 
1996 - 2004 
36100 Ocala, FL 258,916 2 
36500 Olympia, WA 207,355 1 
36740 Orlando-Kissimmee, FL 1,644,561 4 
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 753,197 1 
37340 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 476,230 1 
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 3,251,876 14 
38300 Pittsburgh, PA 2,431,087 11 
38900 Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 1,927,881 5 
39100 Poughkeepsie-Newburgh-Middletown, NY 621,517 1 
39340 Provo-Orem, UT 376,774 4 
39540 Racine, WI 188,831 2 
39580 Raleigh-Cary, NC 797,071 5 
39740 Reading, PA 373,638 2 
39900 Reno-Sparks, NV 342,885 2 
40060 Richmond, VA 1,096,957 5 
40380 Rochester, NY 1,037,831 2 
40900 Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville, CA 1,796,857 7 
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL 2,698,687 4 
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 2,813,833 10 
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1,735,819 2 
42020 San Luis Obispo-Paso Robles, CA 246,681 1 
42060 Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 399,347 1 
42220 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 458,614 1 
42580 Seaford, DE 156,638 3 
43620 Sioux Falls, SD 187,093 1 
43780 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 316,663 2 
44060 Spokane, WA 417,939 3 
45060 Syracuse, NY 650,154 3 
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 2,395,997 7 
45940 Trenton-Ewing, NJ 350,761 1 
46060 Tucson, AZ 843,746 2 
46140 Tulsa, OK 859,532 1 
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC 1,576,370 5 
48900 Wilmington, NC 274,532 1 
49180 Winston-Salem, NC 421,961 2 
49740 Yuma, AZ 160,026 1 
*For the year 2000, obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau 
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Table 2:  MSA Selected Summary Statistics  
  Mean Standard Deviation 
Population** 945,023 991,111 
Income $20,908.11 5104.5 
Age 35 4.11 
Black 10.52% 0.113 
White 85.36% 0.116 
Employed 47.27% 0.065 
Unemployed 2.16% 0.015 
High School Graduate  23.75% 0.066 
Bachelor's Degree 12.10% 0.048 
Graduate Degree 5.42% 0.028 
Food Stamp Receipient 17.69% 0.065 
Private Health Ins. Coverage 57.03% 0.963 
Medicaid Coverage 9.20% 0.056 
Medicare Coverage 13.44% 0.058 
Union Membership 1.30% 0.013 
Union Coverage 0.15% 0.003 
Employed Retail Sector 10.64% 0.033 
Employed Manufacturing Sector 6.87% 0.040 
Employed Transportation Sector 2.24% 0.016 
** Based on the 2000 U.S. Census Bureau  
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Table 3:  OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Effects of Walmart  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Medicaid Coverage 
    
Total Walmarts / 100 -0.108 -0.106 -0.156 -0.105 -0.202 0.055 0.039 
  (0.018)** (0.018)** (0.095) (0.021)** (0.092)** (0.17) (0.171) 
    
R
2
 0.025 0.025 0.560 0.244 0.597 0.657 0.675 
                
Panel B: Union Membership 
    
Total Walmarts / 100 -0.009 -0.008 -0.002 0.001 -0.008 -0.027 -0.017 
  (0.005)** (0.005) (0.025) (0.005) (0.025) (0.051) (0.052) 
    
R
2
 0.003 0.006 0.590 0.091 0.599 0.676 0.679 
                
Panel C: Private Healthcare Coverage 
    
Total Walmarts / 
100 0.081 0.085 0.230 0.014 0.259 0.001 0.103 
  (0.033)** (0.033)** (0.145) (0.028)** (0.117)** (0.309) (0.305) 
    
R
2
 0.005 0.006 0.663 0.511 0.774 0.707 0.728 
                
Controls? Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend? Yes Yes   
MSA Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes 
MSA-Specific 
Trends? Yes Yes 
    
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 702 702 
                
**denotes significance at the 5% level 
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Table 4: Lagged Effects of Walmart on Medicaid Coverage, Union Membership, and Private Healthcare 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Medicaid Coverage Union Membership Private Healthcare Coverage 
    
Walmart Opened / 100 -0.126 -0.001 -0.017 -0.084 -0.057 0.834 -0.084 -0.057 0.834 
  (0.232) (0.251) (0.319) (0.347) (0.487) (1.029) (0.347) (0.487) (1.029) 
L1.Walmart Opened / 100 -0.040 -0.024 0.759 0.595 -0.165 1.850 0.595 -0.165 1.850 
  (0.342) (0.435) (0.56) (0.553) (0.613) (1.449) (0.553) (0.613) (1.449) 
L2.Walmart Opened / 100 0.274 0.746 1.305 0.487 -0.498 2.383 0.487 -0.498 2.383 
  (0.399) (0.568) (0.84) (0.607) (0.959) (2.409) (0.607) (0.959) (2.409) 
L3.Walmart Opened / 100 0.518 1.125 1.206 -0.022 -0.921 2.558 -0.022 -0.921 2.558 
  (0.389) (0.62) (0.983) (0.542) (0.962) (2.656) (0.542) (0.962) (2.656) 
L4.Walmart Opened / 100 0.887 0.470 
 
-0.753 2.229 
 
-0.753 2.229 
  
 
(0.473) (0.904) (0.724) (2.228) (0.724) (2.228) 
L5.Walmart Opened / 100 -0.258 
 
1.877 
 
1.877 
  
 
(0.715) 
  
(1.175) 
  
(1.175) 
                    
R
2
 0.780 0.801 0.872 0.829 0.854 0.870 0.829 0.854 0.870 
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend?   
MSA Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA-Specific Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 468 390 312   468 390 312   468 390 312 
**denotes significance at the 5% level
31 
 
 
 
 
**denotes significance at the 5% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: OLS and Fixed Effects Estimates of Effects of Walmart  
  
Income Medicare 
Union 
Coverage 
Food 
Stamp 
Recipients 
Retail 
Employment   
      
Total Walmarts / 100 -229.6 -0.192 0.000 -0.351 -0.394 
  (167.8) (0.133) (0.018) (0.231) (0.154)** 
    
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend?   
MSA Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA-Specific Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
    
R
2
 0.855 0.86 0.291 0.698 0.395 
Observations 702 702 702 702 702 
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Table 6: Lagged Effects of Walmart Openings 
  
Income Medicare 
Union 
Coverage 
Food 
Stamp 
Recipients 
Retail 
Employment   
Walmart Opened / 100 124.5 -0.052 0.01 0.181 0.021 
  (268.1) (0.258) (0.032) (0.758) (0.375) 
L1.Walmart Opened / 100 -174.4 0.402 -0.03 -0.498 0.608 
  (419.2) (0.431) (0.047) (1.01) (0.7) 
L2.Walmart Opened / 100 220.6 0.554 -0.02 -0.298 0.914 
  (699.) (0.617) (0.072) (1.63) (0.957) 
L3.Walmart Opened / 100 418.4 0.103 -0.07 -0.442 0.425 
  (779.5) (0.756) (0.084) (1.886) (1.143) 
L4.Walmart Opened / 100 415.1 -0.146 -0.07 -0.436 -0.326 
  (807.3) (0.819) (0.094) (1.726) (1.148) 
L5.Walmart Opened / 100 304.5 -0.677 0.01 0.345 0.263 
  (527.7) (0.509) (0.064) (1.026) (0.933) 
      
Controls? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Trend?   
MSA Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA-Specific Trends? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R
2
 0.922 0.916 0.60 0.772 0.723 
Observations 312 312 312 312 312 
            
 
